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Civilian control of the Philippines emerged early in the era of American administration, 
diminishing the authority of the military and facilitating Filipino participation in the regime. 
Throughout this period American public servants relied on Filipino collaboration, cooperation, 
and eventually permission to accomplish their tasks. Many Americans found this dynamic 
frustrating. They were supposed to be the experts in charge of creating a modern state on these 
Pacific islands. Administrators, civil servants, educators, and public health officials embraced a 
progressive agenda that relied upon efficiency, technology, and expertise to develop the 
Philippines. From the beginning of the Insular Government, structural limits constrained 
Americans' ability to implement reforms. Filipino demands for independence shaped policy in 
Washington and confined colonial development within boundaries established by the colonized 
elite. 
 
America's tentative formulation of colonial policy empowered Filipino elites in their demands 
for independence, and Filipinization programs simultaneously frustrated and demoralized 
Americans in public service positions. Public statements against Philippine independence 
constituted an unpardonable sin. For most Filipino elites, political independence remained the 
litmus test for notable government positions. Americans who spoke negatively on the subject 
faced retribution. Positions within all aspects of the government became linked with political 
independence. Filipinization represented a focal point that led from governing to government.  
 
American public servants emerged from a bureaucratic-minded middle class. Robert Wiebe 
argues in The Search for Order that a new middle class embraced the ideals of associations and 
scientific methods to form a bureaucratic society. These professionals in medicine, law, 
economics, and social work, as well as specialists in business, labor, and agriculture 
distinguished themselves by their expert status.[1] Resistance to these reformers' intentions led to 
impatience with existing systems and the slow pace of change. Wiebe insists on the importance 
of bureaucratic approaches for the middle class.[2] The placement of self-imagined experts 
within an American colonial bureaucracy locates these servants well within the progressive 
frame. 
 
Americans developed programs intended to uplift the majority of Filipinos but often encountered 
an elite political oligarchy that insisted upon political independence as a priority. Their 
progressive agenda mirrored many of those in the United States, including efficient government, 
secular education, and public health. Sanitation and public health initiatives attended to the 
physical development of the population. American doctors, nurses, and sanitation experts sought 
transformation in the Islands. These reformers often found that Filipino leaders rivaled big-city 
politicians back home in steering the development agenda towards partisan objectives. 
 
Public health officials acted within the early twentieth-century framework of social 
progressivism. They believed that by doing good they would benefit the general population of 
the Islands. An overarching faith in problem solving and the impartiality of scientific methods 
drove these individuals forward in their endeavors. America's colonial project of developing the 
Philippines offered numerous opportunities to apply scientific principles, especially towards the 
elimination of malaria and hookworm. Health officials utilized their experiences in America as a 
basis for tackling these two diseases. Significantly, the newly formed Bureau of Science 
established a bastion for experts to insulate themselves within a scientific enclave in Manila. 
American experts often found their paths to problem solving strewn with political obstacles tied 
to autonomy and independence. 
 
The Rockefeller Foundation (RF) supported public health initiatives in the Philippines under the 
rubric of self-help. The RF typically funded projects as a cooperative program with the 
government. They shared expenditures on an equal basis during the first year with proportionally 
less support during subsequent years.[3] The following review of the RF's activities provides 
context for the specific discussion of their progressive agenda. 
 
The RF's International Health Board conducted a survey of health conditions in 1913 that helped 
formulate specific programs that appeared useful in developing the Philippines. The RF 
appointed Dr. Victor Heiser to oversee activities seen as "stimulating them to self-help." The first 
such program in 1915 consisted of a hospital ship envisioned as a traveling dispensary, or clinic, 
that traversed the southern islands. The RF terminated the project after a few unsuccessful years 
characterized by high costs and few patients. During the 1920s a number of valuable programs 
addressed the Islands' health status, including a nurse training program, public health 
laboratories, malaria control projects, and education. Advisors assisted the Philippine 
Government in efforts to improve the status of the College of Medicine at the University of the 
Philippines. In tandem with insular programs, the RF supported a fellowship program whereby 
students from the Islands studied in America.[4]  
 
Specific projects directed towards eliminating hookworm and malaria dominated the RF's focus 
during the mid-1920s. Additionally, the RF funded the Bureau of Science in Manila, which 
pursued theoretical and practical solutions to tropical diseases. For example, a biological 
laboratory at the Bureau conducted primary research on typhoid. This led to a number of malaria 
control projects in Pampanga, Laguna, and on the island of Mindoro. After these initial grant-
based projects proved their merits, the Philippine Health Service assumed overall program 
responsibility.[5]  
 
The RF funded two visiting professors for the University of the Philippines. A grant of over 
$37,000 supported Robert W. Hegner of Johns Hopkins, a professor of parasitology, and William 
B. Wherry of the University of Cincinnati, a professor of bacteriology and immunology, at the 
School of Hygiene and Public Health. At a more basic level, the RF initiated sanitation studies 
under the direction of Dr. Clark Yeager, which sought "to determine the type of sanitary latrine 
best adapted to locality." Programs that focused on malaria control, local sanitation, and 
fellowship grants continued into the 1930s. However, the anticipated independence and 
increased Filipino demands for practical application of these programs accelerated the RF's 
desire to complete the projects and leave the Islands.[6]  
 
The Public Health Service shifted its personnel as Filipinization programs proceeded. Public 
health positions initially included many Americans in higher grades of the Service. "Up to 1913, 
the chiefs of hospitals were all Americans, with the exception of that of Butuan. Of seventeen 
medical inspectors, but two were Filipinos, the rest, Americans." During the period from 1909 to 
1913 there were nine junior medical inspectors, all Filipinos, and twenty-seven district health 
officers, five of whom were Americans.[7] Filipinization goals under Governor-General Francis 
B. Harrison induced some of these Americans to reconsider their careers. 
 
Dr. Heiser directed the Bureau of Health in Manila prior to joining the RF as Director for the 
East of the International Health Board. IHB projects included the broad efforts to control 
smallpox, cholera, and plague as well as the reduction of amoebic dysentery and malaria. Heiser 
often worked in his office until midnight or later and was widely regarded as an effective 
bureaucrat. "He has been particularly successful in dealing with the Filipino officials. He gets 
what he goes after, and does it not by driving but by tact, unruffled good humor, and everlasting 
persistence." After thirteen years in the Islands, Heiser decided to leave government service. He 
grew discouraged with the Harrison administration which allowed "the native politician freer 
rein and thereby to impair the efficiency of the Government service." He viewed the future 
apprehensively. Heiser earned a combined salary from the Philippine Government and the U. S. 
Public Health Service of $10,500, but considered abandoning his retirement allowance and 
accepting a smaller salary "in case of service that would not keep him continuously in the 
tropics."[8]  
 
The Philippine Health Service created programs for the general population based upon prevailing 
medical practices. By 1920 public dispensaries provided free medical assistance to the poor 
including over one hundred in Manila and 830 in the provinces. The Service developed reports 
recommending improvements where necessary. For example, the "Report on the Typhoid 
Situation in Manila during 1924" included detailed records illustrating sound experimental 
procedures and the application of statistical analysis. The report traced variations of the number 
of monthly typhoid cases based upon mean, standard deviations, and coefficient of variations. 
They discovered that typhoid occurred most frequently among Filipinos (237 per 100,000) while 
Americans maintained the lowest rate (64 per 100,000).[9] The specific causes of typhoid 
outbreaks remained complex. The committee's 1925 report attributed typhoid in Manila to 
several sources including unsanitary handling of the water, defective sewage disposal, flies, 
unsanitary and crowded living conditions, and the presence of carriers engaged in food handling 
occupations. 
 
Locally supplied produce posed an area of concern, especially for Americans living in the 
Islands. Fresh vegetables in Manila appeared suspect during the 1920s. Therefore, the Service 
initiated a research program investigating truck gardens, operated for the most part by Chinese 
farmers, as a possible source of contamination. The report found no application of human or 
animal waste as fertilizer since farmers preferred nutrients supplied by vegetable products such 
as copra and soy. Farmers often utilized shallow wells for irrigation and washing of the 
produce.[10]  
 
While little contamination of fresh vegetables appeared at the point of production, frequent 
handling during transportation and at the markets posed a highly probable source of infection. 
Findings indicated, "in many instances water was obtained from the horse trough in the street 
rather than from the faucet available for that purpose." Still, the committee found no evidence to 
believe consumption of produce was a major source of typhoid, dysentery, or other intestinal 
diseases. However, they urged greater care of washing and handling vegetables in the 
markets.[11] These findings generated increased inspections of city markets and programs 
regulating the handling of produce from farm to consumer. 
 
Philippine health initiatives developed from traditions established in America. Concepts and 
approaches first implemented in the rural south underpinned those in the Islands. Progressive 
social programs extended beyond urban centers, often cited as the focus of social projects. In his 
1992 book, The Paradox of Southern Progressivism, William A. Link explains how paternalism 
and reform shaped social policy. He argues that two conflicting views influenced Southern 
progressivism; traditionalists from small communities who clung to their local values vs. 
progressive reformers seeking solutions through state intervention. The anti-hookworm crusades 
supported by the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission blended education and health reform during 
the 1910s.[12] Early attempts to shape public opinion regarding improved hygiene generated 
mixed results.[13] A crusade centered on county dispensaries, however, proved effective in 
demonstrating the effects of the disease and the methods of control.  
 
Malaria and hookworm proved particularly troublesome in the Islands. Public health initiatives 
may have built upon past experience but developed according to local conditions. Americans and 
Filipinos identified the problems and implemented solutions that may appear today as both 
hazardous and environmentally irresponsible. However, at the time they constituted a 
multifaceted approach in hopes of eliminating or at least controlling these two diseases. 
 
Early in the American Era both military and civilian projects focused on eliminating standing 
water as a means of malaria control. These efforts targeted mosquito breeding grounds but 
offered only part of the solution. Civil engineering projects sought to eliminate standing water 
near homes and alter streams to minimize slow-moving water. Individuals contracted malaria 
independent of income level. An investigation in Laguna Province suggested that malaria 
occurred among both rich and poor. Quinine offered the most practical means to minimize the 
number of malaria cases, reduce mortality rates, and protect the public.[14] In spite of these 
traditional methods, the climate, topography, and agricultural landscape posed continued 
challenges to malaria control. 
 
Rice remained an important crop in much of the Philippines with over four million acres under 
cultivation. Filipino rice workers usually lived in barrios of between ten and one hundred homes 
and obtained their water from artesian wells. Malaria constituted a pervasive disease in rice 
producing provinces. Mortality figures for the period between 1915 and 1924 suggested that for 
a population in these areas of 3.1 million people, deaths from malaria ranged between eight and 
fourteen thousand per year. During this period experimental applications of Paris Green 
(Arsenious Oxide) larvicide proved promising as a supplemental control program. Studies 
suggested that cultivated rice fields generated few mosquitoes whereas the canals used for 
irrigation served as breeding grounds for dangerous malaria carriers such as A. Minimus and A. 
Ludlowi.[15]  
 
The International Health Board informed the Philippine Sugar Association of the benefits and 
procedures required for malaria control programs at the centrals and plantations. By 1925 
experiments suggested that the anopheles mosquito, primary carrier for Malaria in the Islands, 
breeds in running streams during the dry season. Therefore, they recommended beginning 
control efforts immediately after the rainy season.  
 
Mosquito control programs focused on attacking the larvae in the water. Certainly, eliminating 
standing water constituted a major factor in control, but this failed to address the various streams 
and ponds found in the region. Oil remained a common method, but required a complete film 
over the water surface, which proved ineffective on streams due to excessive vegetation along 
the water's edge. Mixtures of cresol and water offered a solution for small areas. However, 
experiments at Del Carmen confirmed the effectiveness of Paris Green as a larvicide in the 
Philippines. This poison killed the larvae as it fed on the particles. Applying a mixture of Paris 
Green and fine road dust provided an economical mixture for the water's surface.[16] Although 
commonly used at the time, Paris Green also remained widely recognized as a deadly poison.  
 
Public health officials faced wide-ranging problems associated with the prevention and treatment 
of hookworm. For much of the period, few individuals lived in homes with flush toilets. Most 
people either used privies, public midden sheds, or defecated along riverbeds and open 
ground.[17] People often made no effort at disposal, relying on pigs and sometimes chickens to 
feed on the night soil.[18] Health and sanitation workers created public education programs, in 
part through the school system, that encouraged building bored-hole latrines, a solution 
particularly suited to the soil conditions in the Islands. The bored-hole latrine consisted of a 
vertical shaft approximately twelve feet deep. An augur cut through the surface soil and then a 
series of blast holes dynamited through the adobe sub-soil. Occasionally, another charge of 
dynamite was exploded at the hole's base in order to increase capacity by creating a series of 
fissures several feet outward from the central hole.[19]  
 
In order to facilitate the building of latrines, a grant of 300 pesos provided seed money for an 
easy payment plan demonstration system in the municipality of Navotas. At an estimated cost of 
15 pesos per latrine, private accommodations remained comparatively expensive for many 
Filipinos. The local auditor suggested the account's title as the "Rockefeller Toilet Funds" but 
other titles proved more suitable including the "Sanitation Revolving Fund" and "Toilets-by-
Installment." The fund allowed homeowners to make twelve to fourteen monthly payments until 
the cost was fully repaid. Private latrines offered improved sanitation compared to "constructing 
public midden sheds which are expensive and unsatisfactory."[20]  
 
Treatment options for hookworm included relatively dangerous medications. Dr. Charles N. 
Leach commended the work performed in Cebu by Health Service workers. He reported no 
fatalities out of 26,000 cases treated with carbon tetrachloride as a result of the quality of the 
drug and the denial of treatment to any patient exhibiting liver disease. "This record is one of 
which the Philippine Health Service should be proud, as they are the only organization on record 
who can show no fatalities after twenty five thousand treatments with carbon tetrachloride." 
Carbon tetrachloride offered an inexpensive solution, costing an average of 5 centavos per 
dosage.[21] 
 
The Service initiated an island-wide campaign against hookworm. The department expected all 
inspectors to commence a screening program to ascertain the level of infestations. In 1923 
doctors administered carbon tetrachloride at a dosage of 1 cc to each 7 kg. of body weight. The 
Philippine Health Service limited medications to those re-purified by the Bureau of Science. 
Guidelines cautioned to only take this treatment under the supervision of a doctor, which 
included a minimum observation period of five hours.[22]  
 
Americans working in the Islands often felt unfulfilled. Dr. Leach longed to return to America 
after working in the Islands for three years. Already in 1924, a general concern about withdrawal 
of support for the Islands affected these professionals. Leach commented, "Our failure to 
accomplish more has been due largely to the unsettled political situation and a growing 
movement of non-cooperation of the native towards Americans generally." He explained, "This 
has been most marked towards the efforts of Gov. Gen. Wood, which of course is reflected in 
their relations with the members of the Foundation staff." Leach believed that Filipinos were so 
focused on independence that it was not wise to pursue public health projects.[23] 
 
The Bureau of Science operated as a branch of the Philippine government and served as a central 
source for laboratory and scientific work. In 1915 Bureau personnel provided virtually all 
biological and pathological work for the Bureau of Health, chemical tests for Customs Service, 
testing required under the Food and Drug Act, the manufacture of vaccines and serums, material 
testing, assaying, as well as original research. Heiser noted that "the old employees, whose 
experience in the Philippines is a great asset, are leaving rapidly owing to the threatened 
reduction in salaries and the hostility of research work." He believed this institution served as a 
unique outpost in the Pacific. "With the possible exception of the laboratory of the Japanese 
Government in Tokyo and the laboratories in Australia, the laboratory of the Bureau of Science 
in Manila is the only fully equipped institution in the entire Orient." Known throughout Europe 
and America, it contributed to the progress of medicine, sanitation, and economic development 
of the Islands.[24]  
 
Filipinization altered the composition of Bureau personnel. By 1925 the number of employees 
stood at twenty-one persons, all but two of whom were Filipinos, Prof. Haughwout, an American 
protozoologist, and Dr. Schoble, a European temporarily in charge of the Biological Department. 
The position of head of this department remained vacant after Dr. Gomez left the Bureau. 
Politics influenced the replacement process since government officials resisted appointing an 
American. George Lacy reported on current conditions: "At present, it seems to me that little can 
be done toward getting an American because there has been a strong movement to discontinue 
granting other special contracts." He continued, "Anyone employed at a salary of more than 
6,000 pesos must be employed on special contract basis, since that amount is the maximum 
salary paid by the Civil Service." Most nominations originated from Filipinos since those 
initiated by the Governor-General appeared doomed for rejection.[25]  
 
Virtually any program that involved selection of individuals for a position of note turned 
political. For example, Heiser attempted to treat the fellowship program in a non-political 
manner. "It is well to remember that the situation in Manila is always loaded with dynamite," he 
cautioned, "and that even a disinterested desire to be of help may be misunderstood and be swept 
into the ever turbulent political sea." He continued with his metaphor: "The men in responsible 
government administrative posts in the Philippines are pulled here and there by the fierce 
political currents, and sometimes it may appear that they are not carrying out exactly the 
promises made with regard to future employment of those to who we have granted fellowships." 
Heiser cautioned that in spite of the politics, the fellows usually moved into responsible 
positions. He generally "first took up with the Filipino officials, and later secured the 
acquiescence of Vice-Governor Gilmore."[26]  
 
Politics led to the reduction of philanthropic assistance in the Philippines. After an investigative 
trip around the Islands, Selskar Gunn recommended termination of RF funding. Evaluating RF-
funded projects, he assessed the malaria project under the School of Public Health useful and the 
rural sanitation programs relatively successful. However, a great deal of internal bickering 
apparently existed: "The Filipinos fight so much amongst themselves that work is made 
extraordinarily difficult." "Just how long it will be worthwhile for the Foundation to cooperate 
with the Filipino Bureau of Health will depend on the success of the present undertakings," Gunn 
concluded. Furthermore, the Bureau of Science continued to atrophy. Gunn regretted its change 
from research to one of "applied science." He noted its decline, stating that it "will become 
poorer as the few remaining American scientists are chiseled out of their jobs by the Filipinos." 
While the professionalism of the School of Hygiene at the University of Philippines continued to 
impress him, the bureaus of Health and Education appeared wanting. Gunn expressed his overall 
disappointment of the current state of the Islands, blaming much on the continued Filipinization 
programs. "I can only repeat that it seems to me a tragedy that these people should already have 
been given so much independence with the possibility of their getting full independence before 
many years have elapsed." Although the RF tended to provide program specific support for a set 
number of years, perceptions similar to Gunn's may have terminated this funding sooner than 
expected in the Islands. As Gunn concluded, "Under existing conditions, I would not advocate 
any extension of the present Foundation program."[27]  
 
Change at the Bureau of Science may be indicative of the conflicting goals of American 
philanthropists and Filipino administrators. Americans viewed this Manila institution as a facility 
for experts to study tropical disease, creating a scientific bastion in the Pacific. Filipinos 
expected results that could be directly applied to their society. As Filipinos increasingly replaced 
Americans in all facets of government and private institutions, their visions prevailed at the 
Bureau. This example mirrors what Progressives faced in many environments back home in both 
urban and rural settings. Experts may have had science on their side, but unless their programs 
actuated clear benefits for the people, they ultimately failed.  
 
Transitions from theoretical to applied science created disappointment within the Bureau. Dr. 
Paul F. Russell worked at the Bureau of Science from December 1929 to 1934. Russell 
complained of the dissection of the Bureau in order to provide practical results. "Such plans 
leave very little place for pure research and the simple fact that years of theoretical study may 
have been required to make possible the production of one usable device seems to be almost 
entirely ignored." For example, organic chemistry merged with inorganic under the umbrella of 
industrial research. Even the buildings no longer retained their exclusivity, but operated under 
the generic "Science Buildings." Russell cast a dubious eye on the future and complained, "If 
Under-Secretary Vargas has his way it is certain that the Bureau of Science as you knew it, and 
as it was planned, will no longer exist." He predicted a far more mundane institution. "It will be a 
fourth-rate museum, a testing and measuring laboratory, an uninspired manufactory of serums 
and vaccines, and a place where men will play at industrial research." Russell regretted its 
destruction at the hands of local politicians. "There are few places where there are better 
opportunities or larger needs." [28] 
 
American experts in public health learned that local politics often trumped science in a colonial 
environment. Successful programs that combated typhoid, malaria, and hookworm proved 
beneficial to the Philippine population. However, experiments frequently suggested solutions 
that created cures through potentially deadly means. One marvels at the controlled administration 
of Paris Green and carbon tetrachloride and its apparently benign effect on patients. Medical 
experts faced the same realities that other civil servants found so vexing; Filipino politicians 
often prioritized programs based upon autonomy and independence. Their long-term goals 
ignored short-term benefits regardless of the problems at hand. 
 
 
 
Editor's Note: This research report is presented here with the author's permission but should not 
be cited or quoted without the author's consent. Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports 
Online is a periodic publication of the Rockefeller Archive Center. Edited by Ken Rose and 
Erwin Levold. Research Reports Online is intended to foster the network of scholarship in the 
history of philanthropy and to highlight the diverse range of materials and subjects covered in the 
collections at the Rockefeller Archive Center. The reports are drawn from essays submitted by 
researchers who have visited the Archive Center, many of whom have received grants from the 
Archive Center to support their research. The ideas and opinions expressed in this report are 
those of the author and are not intended to represent the Rockefeller Archive Center. 
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